I. Mobile technology has become critical communication which raises new privacy concerns.
Mobile phones are overtaking all other telecommunications forms for basic communication. Their flexibility facilitates new uses which lead to unique dependencies on the technology, such as advance hurricane i and earthquake notifications.
ii Their size and convenience makes them a truly ubiquitous technology. This makes the devices and technology important not only to consumers, but to people as a society, as these devices shape the way we interact profoundly.
As Marshall McLuhan wrote in 1964, the medium and the message become hopelessly intertwined.
iii Young people have become more dependent on the connectedness and a continual updates that the technology enables. iv In a recent study, only 1.1% of young people were found to be willing to face the prospect of life without a cell phone, should something happen to theirs. v As a result of it's ubiquity, cell phone usage has become a social status, enabling those to participate in a sprawling, yet immediate culture, engaging peers to coordinate on a vast scale, yet immediate response. vi Any without cell phones are simply unable to participate in this dominant society.
Mobile telephony is becoming an increasingly critical service. Many people, especially younger people and early adopters have migrated away from fixed "land lines" entirely. vii Since their telephony needs are entirely addressed by the mobile phones they carry, as young people move around, they no longer feel they have need of traditional telephone service and see no value in the added expense. This means that their cell phones become life critical infrastructure. In response to the German publication, researchers began examining phones for this type of data and uncovered files hidden on their phones that included tracking and other information. xliii This data was being transferred off the phone at regular intervals. It was later traced back to the application Carrier IQ. This application was used in a large number of popular smart phones and employed by all major carriers. xliv This was the subject of scandal when first discovered, but now much has been done to assimilate this into the popular consciousness.
Initially, the software maker threatened the researcher for publishing his findings.
xlv This is not an uncommon action for software vendors who feel threatened by exposure of their vulnerabilities and is the subject of ongoing debate. xlvi It creates a chilling effect for those who seek to help other users protect themselves by alerting them to vulnerabilities. xlvii Software makers who seek to enjoin this type of discussion dismiss the possibility that more malicious researchers could already be exploiting the software, leaving their users vulnerable and exposed because they want to avoid the bad press associated with vulnerabilities.
Eventually CarrierIQ's threat was retracted. Raising awareness of the issue the plaintiffs hoped to silence by engaging in a legal battle, was more detrimental to their efforts than the initial publication of the find was. xlviii The threats against the security researcher strongly suggest that the company that creates the software, if not the 6/30/13 xi carriers that applied it it, understood that the general public would object to the uncontrolled data collection if they knew of it.
As a result of the ensuing furor, Senator Al Franken, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law, posed questions to all four major cellular carriers.
Their answers were equivocal, but generally suggested that the quality of their service relies on collecting this data and each called attention to how they removed the application from their mobile offerings. xlix Verizon declined to respond to the Senator's questions.
Unsatisfied with the answers and still concerned about mobile phone consumers, Senator Franken petitioned the FCC to reconsider their 2006 decision not to extend CPNI protections to the mobile handset as part of the telecommunications network. As a result of Senator Franken's request, the FCC is reconsidering the issue after accepting comments that relate to CarrierIQ and other potential data-collecting software.
l It would be easy to believe that because of all the negative press CarrierIQ received regarding their analytics that the carriers might stop doing business with them.
li Nevertheless, even after all this bad press and negative publicity, CarrierIQ is still in use and some users have no opportunity to opt out. lii The carriers themselves offer little evidence to support their claims that they will ever be willingly forthcoming with information on their handset personal data collection practices.
B. The Federal Trade Commission has embarked upon a new mobile privacy initiative.
The Federal Trade Commission is actively pursuing issues surrounding privacy online and in other contexts. liii Their jurisdiction is largely limited to two major issues:
6/30/13 xii whether a company was deceptive in the explanation or implementation of their privacy policy and whether a company handles customer data safely and securely.
The FTC has entered into consent decrees with major social application providers for their failure to protect user privacy or otherwise incompletely disclosing use of customer provided data. For example, Google entered into a consent decree with the FTC regarding their privacy practices that had been lacking in many areas. liv In just over a year, they were found in violation of that decree by ignoring a user data preference flag set in an uncommonly used browser. lv Although Google is not (necessarily) one of the organizations of interest to the FCC, the rapidity with which the decree was violated suggests that there is a systemic disregard for consumer privacy in the software industry overall.
The FTC continues to generate consent decrees with many major social networking sites. lvi The relevance of this is that these sites collect and use or sell data from unsuspecting users. Mobile users are often both unwitting to their contribution of personal data as well as unaware of its use. However, the FTC lacks the authority to regulate this practice, as there is neither history nor expectation of consent involved in collecting telephone network monitoring data, which could be argued why the CPNI provision was included in the statute. III. Political climate is good, yet united industry could undermine efforts to address privacy concerns.
Congressional politics do not have a direct bearing on this issue, yet it is worth considering the climate, as that will influence the FCC in their decision-making process.
Naturally, industry lobbyists also have a great deal of influence in the process. Political support for privacy seems strong and getting stronger, but the opposite tug of industry could cause the pendulum to swing against that building momentum.
A. Privacy currently has a warm political climate.
The politics of privacy are strange. Vocal support is bipartisan, but so is a universal reluctance to make any legislative changes that might upset powerful advertising interests. When the threat of terrorism is raised, privacy loses out to the call of national security, regardless of what benefit the security program may be.
Congress "supports" more privacy, but does not take much action to achieve it.
There is a sense that to provide effective security, it is necessary to trade off privacy. There is widespread political support for increased regulation of any privacy issue.
Mobile has been singled out as an attractive target, as the kind of information that is available can be highly personal and collected without direct knowledge or willing participation. Legislation is in the works to address problems specific to cell phones, but it could take years to work its way through Congress. The FCC already has a mandate to regulate certain pieces of data. This rulemaking could conclude swiftly, allowing the FCC and FTC enforcement to move forward quickly to ensure the seamless privacy the President has identified the need for. 
C. Industry maintains an illusion of self-regulation.
An industry could be considered self-regulating when market pressures and competition make mutual enforcement of industry guidelines effective. lxxxviii Unless by "Industry" the carriers refer to "advertising" rather than "telecommunications," which is at 6/30/13 xviii stake, there are no industry guidelines nor any market forces, within the industry or with the customer base, to enforce compliance. It is the carriers that have chosen to hide the Carrier IQ application as it was originally marketed to them with a user interface.
lxxxix Self-regulation does not work in this ecosystem. The problems that this initiative was intended to combat are longstanding and there is no sign of anything changing.
xc Although some carriers hold back on the data they collect, there is ongoing competition pressure not to do so. xci Nevertheless, industry believes that it is already self-regulating and the current level of control is sufficient. xcii CarrierIQ is merely an example of the kinds of things that carriers can and will do given no controls. Businesses have a duty to their stockholders to manage revenues, but duties to customer privacy are vague and non-specific.
IV. Technology and Control issues are key to industry resistance to allowing users to manage their own privacy.
The core of this conflict, as with many of the issues the FCC faces, centers on the technology. The fundamental argument for collecting data is to provide a high quality of service that can only be provided by collecting a broad set of information. But the conflict goes deeper. Technological questions arise over who has actual control and who should have that control. The FCC now considers who is in the best position to make technical decisions that affect the functioning of the device, the network and the user's experience.
A. The pursuit of superior service drives the carriers' interest in controlling the handset. When cell phones are purchased, carriers subsidize the cost of the phone. xciv As a result, they have the handset vendors develop operating systems specific to the carrier, locking down the handset to prevent the user from significantly altering the functionality of the phone. Customers are not necessarily happy about it, so a movement has arisen around hacking into or "Jailbreaking" or "rooting" their cell phones. This is the practice where users alter the software running on the phone to gain control of its operation.
xcv By breaking through the carrier's protections, the user gains the ability to uninstall any software that runs on the user-facing processor.
Customers are not always willing to accept the current repercussions for taking control of their phones. xcvi Although the advantage of running anything they may choose is alluring, it is typically technically challenging and not something an average user may want to undertake. xcvii This practice generally voids any warranty on the phone. xcviii Further, it opens the phone up to increased vulnerabilities, even if the user is careful.
xcix Current copyright law only makes an exception to anti-circumvention rules for this practice, which is re-reviewed every three years. c It is an enormous risk for the user to contemplate hacking their own phones, but many feel strongly enough about it to take 6/30/13 xx on these risks which would be unnecessary if carriers weren't so insistent on withholding control of user-owned devices to begin with.
Carriers are not typically irresponsible with user data. Vulnerabilities have been found in carrier-installed applications, but this is a new and quickly evolving arena for carriers. ci The telecom industry is aggressively pursuing end-to-end security measures, to assure data protection from handset to destination. cii This is an ongoing effort to provide security and privacy to users of all services.
It is entirely probable that telecom carriers can provide superior service with the tools such as Carrier IQ. It is probable that a completely locked down phone could be useful to many people. It is necessary, however, for telecommunications companies to come to terms with the fact that even if they did try to maintain control of everything on the handset, they would still not be able to actually control everything. Carriers need to provide user transparency so the customer can make real informed choices based on their personal willingness to take on each risk.
B. Handset architecture is already bifurcated to protect critical functions.
When designing the functionality of smart phones, manufacturers understood the need to separate processing capability of the user front end and functionality of the signal processing and radio. Cell handsets were designed to have two distinct levels of access and control. Strong separations were built in between user functionality and radio-telephone operation. ciii Most handsets now have two processors that function as separate computers to handle the different functions.
Mobile Phone Systems, even more than wired telephone handsets must maintain their integrity. civ A clear role of the FCC is to ensure that no consumer action could potentially compromise the integrity of the telephone network. For this reason the 6/30/13 xxi baseband portion of the consumer handset should remain under full control and responsibility of the carrier.
What Carrier IQ has done on some (but not all) phones is bridge these two processors reintegrating the physical and logical separation that was built in. cv Even jailbreaking does not bridge the barrier between the user functionality of the handset and the baseband portion. There is currently no known means of taking control of any baseband operating system in any meaningful way. cvi But considering how this management software is reaching across the barrier between the two processors it would seem the carriers are not satisfied with the portion of the phone that was locked down for their benefit.
C. Carriers argue a false dichotomy exists between software and hardware.
Carriers have established a unique communication model for the handset data that they maintain allows them to skirt regulation entirely. An application on the customer's phone reports data to the provider of that application, such as Carrier IQ, in a transmission as described by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act which extends traditional wiretap voice protections to data. cvii The application provider then shares information that the customer gave them with the carrier. cviii The carrier avoids oversight because this two step process detaches the carrier from collection of network data, which would be covered by Pen-trap Statute. cix It detaches them from FTC liability because it is the third party that is responsible for data collection.
There is no direct relationship between the third party and the telecommunications customer. The distinction here between the payload data that the customer shares with ordinary application vendors is one of knowledge and choice. This is an application that the customer did not install, that the customer is not aware of, and that the customer 6/30/13 xxii cannot control. This software is owned, in every sense of the word, by telecommunications companies.
The most disturbing thing about the method the carriers use to work around regulation is it opens up potential threats to customer privacy that would not otherwise exist. cx Since this data collection software has access to potentially anything that the user does on the phone, the user has no reason to know they need to protect themselves from malicious functions of unprivileged applications and that such applications may use this data to compromise the user's privacy or even financial security.
cxi D. The struggle for control over handsets arises because they remain in the user's hands.
Application privacy and lack of transparency has become a real problem in the mobile marketplace. cxii While the FTC is taking steps to improve this, it gives the carriers a wedge to leverage against their customers. If standard software practices involve a disregard for user privacy concerns then carriers make a good point that they should not be held to a higher level for the same practices.
Mobile phone customers are kept generally unaware of privacy risks and therefore unable to manage them. cxiii Carriers make minimal effort to inform users of the data they gather, what it is used for or how to avoid the collection. User ignorance is likely to be perpetuated due to a deliberate effort by carriers to make their data collection invisible to users. cxiv While recent pressure from the Trade Commission has improved this situation moderately, carriers still do not meet standards of participation and accountability.
6/30/13 xxiii
In the last reconsideration of CPNI regulation, the FCC chose not to regulate handsets due to the opportunity for users to alter the functionality of them. cxv It has come to light that user control is subject to the control of the carriers and the software they require. Because of the control carriers exert over operating system software on the handset, users are unable to make any choice over many applications being run on their handset and the access requests for those applications.
Mobile carriers simultaneously claim that they need the data from customer handsets to provide quality service while claiming they are unable to manage or control data on customer handsets. cxvi This is an unreasonable position to take, as the carriers may effectively block the consumer from securing his own device, while taking no responsibility for the security themselves. While theoretically it is possible to completely open the device to user adaptation, as discussed above with the baseband/userland dichotomy, this is hardly practicable. Ultimately the carrier may continue to control, and thus maintain responsibility for anything generated by the baseband module and collecting data on the baseband would be kept under necessary CPNI standards. The distinction between these areas was defined in the architecture for very good reasons so there is no reason these distinctions should continue to be blurred.
E. Despite carrier's arguments, locking down the handset can increase the chance the handset may be infected with malware. user has no opportunity within the law to prevent any carrier from monitoring these devices.
V. Recommendations
The best solution to the regulation problem is as complex and nuanced as the problem itself. There is a technological tradeoff over control. The carriers argue that a high degree of control over user handsets are necessary to provide a high quality service. Lines between "third party" and "carrier required" become blurred when the carrier forces the user to run third party software without any end user policies or agreements. Third party vendors are also explicitly governed by the CPNI order.
If the carriers' arguments are true and this software is necessary for quality service, then there is a basis for regulation. The CPNI statute does not make any indication of the content/header distinction that is made elsewhere in telecommunications law. If the user is responsible, yet does not have full control of the device, then there is every incentive for the carrier to lock down and collect every piece of data the device is capable of generating, preventing the user any access save the minimal necessary to remain competitive in the smartphone market. Further, there is no incentive for the carrier to take any responsibility for any data collected or distributed beyond their cell towers.
By linking responsibility to control, the carriers can maintain whatever level of control they wish over a device, but will be held to a level of responsibility that rises to that control. Whichever entity holds control over a particular manifestation of technology should be held responsible for maintaining the privacy of information for that technology, whether by the Federal Communications Commission or Trade Commission. By remapping responsibility in this manner, it opens up options for the market in several ways.
Consumers may choose to allow carriers to continue to manage their handsets with the service. The trust an ordinary consumer currently places in a carrier can be reinforced by regulatory controls on exactly what should be trusted. In essence, te carriers could choose to serve as both application providers as well as service providers, which is not unlike the role they play today. Perhaps this is the route most carriers would choose if the choice was entirely up to them.
The FCC should hold Carriers responsible for all baseband data on the handset as CPNI. Further, any data that is transmitted from an application that the user has not 
